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ABSTRACT
The author concludes that the world will most probably remain rife with
conflict even in the twenty first century and that the traditional role of
intelligence will not only continue but will increase in importance.  He
characterizes the international situation as being “more of the same his-
torically”; that is, the existence of several different centers of power and
mutual conflicts based solely on national interests.  In order to protect
and promote one’s national interests, sovereign states will, on one hand,
require its own military forces, and, on the other, its own intelligence
service.  In the future, the goals and priorities of intelligence services will
be subservient to the interests of state policies, and the collection and
analysis of information obtained by “special means” in support of nation-
al foreign policy will apply universally to all world intelligence services.
The most important changes will take place in the technical aspects of
intelligence.  However, in spite of fears expressed about an “Orwellian”
solution, which could in the future be at the disposal of intelligence servic-
es as a result of technological advances, the author believes human
sources, humint, will remain the main intelligence tool.  As far as “rules
of the game” are concerned, they will also remain the same, though spo-
radic attempts will be made to devise some internationally acceptable
framework for intelligence activities.
Introduction
The essence, the raison d Œtre of intelligence is the acquisi-
tion of information, which is consciously concealed from interest-
ed outsiders either by state institutions or by other social groups
like political parties or financial bodies, etc. There is no country
which does not have its secrets and would not take steps to pro-
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tect them. Evidently, there is no country in the world whose secrets
would not be of any interest to some of its international partners.
One can safely presume that intelligence is as old as human soci-
ety. It is mentioned in the Old Testament. The subject of intelli-
gence, or to put it in a cruder way, of espionage, was elaborated
on a very high professional level by a Chinese thinker in the fifth
century BC.
Thus, intelligence is an ancient phenomenon, the eternal fea-
ture of all past and present civilizations. (And, should I add, as
honorable as any other institution.)
The volumes of information, which every country considers to
be vital to its interests, are mind-boggling not only in totalitarian
states but in the societies which are habitually called open. Russia
has opened the archives of the USSR. (Something similar, by the
way, was done the first time by the Bolsheviks in 1918.) Recently,
as we have heard, the CIA started to open a portion of its
archives: millions upon millions of confidential and top secret
papers (nothing of actual importance, I regret to observe.) One
can be quite sure that the other, undisclosable part of the archive
is no less impressive in terms of bulk.
But why should one try to penetrate into other people’s
secrets? A US Secretary of State in the 1920s, when presented
with decoded foreign correspondence, remarked: “Gentlemen do
not read other people’s letters!”
Unlike its citizens, the state cannot afford to be a gentleman.
Responsible political leaders cannot be lured into complacency by
a cloudless international situation (if such a situation is imagina-
ble in principle!). History never rests and interstate relations may
undergo extremely quick changes. One can recollect the rapid
transition from “eternal and fraternal friendship” to a bitter con-
frontation between the Soviet Union and China at the end of the
1950s, or the sudden collapse of Iranian-American relations in
1979, when an American client regime was replaced by bitter foes
of the USA. The mission of intelligence is to foresee changes in
such situations, to detect potential threats to the national interest
at the earliest stages.
Intelligence is not a product of war, conflict, or confrontation.
It is a normal, though peculiar, tool of the sovereign state. The
paradoxical nature of the situation is quite evident. The activity of
any intelligence service inevitably implies the violation of the laws
of target countries. An Israeli agent, one Mr Pollard, is serving a
life term in an American prison. An American agent, Mr Baranov,
is serving six years in a Russian jail. In 1994 the French authori-
ties expelled four American diplomats on charges of espionage.
There have been problems concerning Russian activities in the
United States.


























Bangladesh, conducts intelligence activities abroad while perfect-
ly aware that it thus violates or may violate foreign laws. Such is
the reality, which to some extent does not answer strict moral cri-
teria. The world we live in is far from perfect, and only in poetic
dreams can one visualize a time when all nations will fuse into a
happy family and there will be no need for espionage. (Again,
even in happy families sometimes there is a need for little spying.)
The Future
This is, in a word, the present state of affairs. And what is
going to be the role of intelligence agencies in the twenty-first cen-
tury?
The future is concealed from us by an impenetrable curtain,
and it would be a folly to presume that man or the human mind
are capable of tearing down this curtain and predicting with con-
fidence developments for any meaningful historical period.
At the most, we can attempt to chart a possible scenario of the
future, always keeping in mind the possibility of new, now unthink-
able, circumstances coming into play. This happened, for
instance, with the invention of nuclear weapons or with the disin-
tegration of the USSR.
At the moment, one can conjure up several versions of world
developments at the beginning of the new century.
It is a general desire to see the strengthening of positive ten-
dencies which have been shaped during the second half of the
present century: the growing role of the UN; the gradual fusing of
regional organizations into a harmonious universal system; lower-
ing the level of military might and elimination of the most dan-
gerous weapons of mass destruction; solution of conflicts in a
peaceful and equitable manner.
This scenario seems to be an illusion without roots in the past,
without foundation in the present, and without hope in the future.
Let us better leave it to science fiction writers and political dema-
gogues. Intelligence must always be prepared to face harsh real-
ities.
There is another, equally distant possibility. The world has a
single center of might, a sole super-power that is capable of
imposing its will on all of humanity. The role of such a super-
power might be played solely by the United States of America,
whose leading position is persistently, and one must concede,
quite justifiably, stressed by the administration and is accepted by
the international community. History, however, never stops and
there is nothing immutable and eternal. Maintaining the leading
global role might become an unbearable burden even for the
USA. Occasional flashes of isolationist moods in the domestic
politics of the USA are not accidental, they testify to the existence75
of certain premonitions within the American establishment. One
may believe that the doctrine of the leading US role will under-
go some changes and may acquire a more modest character
under pressure from domestic factors and formidable outside
resistance.
Thus, the natural order of things to which we have been
accustomed for decades and centuries is likely to prevail: there
will be several independent but interconnected centers of power
which will continue to exist in a state of relative equilibrium,
partnership and rivalry - something similar to the world depict-
ed by George Orwell but maybe without his imaginative
extremes.
The twentieth century dashed the hopes of past thinkers. It
brought neither peace nor well being to humanity. People are
apt to hope for the better but at all times they have to be pre-
pared for the worse. Unfortunately, the coming century, like its
predecessor, may betray our optimistic expectations.
Look at the Balkans, Latin America, Africa, the Near East,
look at the former USSR. The conclusion of our century hap-
pened to be more troubled and more sanguine than the end of
the nineteenth century.
It seems that local conflicts of different intensity will contin-
ue to poison the life of humanity for foreseeable future.
Moreover, they may grow in bitterness and scale.
One can predict the inevitable growth of rivalry for the con-
trol of limited natural resources, the spread of this rivalry over
new territories, where Russia occupies a special place, and the
sea-floor. It is possible that in the next century new sources of
energy will be developed, but will that mean the slackening of
competition for energy? This is not supported by historical expe-
rience. When oil came to be the main source of energy, strug-
gles for the control of oil-fields produced many a bloody con-
flict. One can also observe that the development of atomic
energy hardly improved the general international picture.
We witness rapid and large-scale deterioration of the envi-
ronment which is aggravated by considerable population
growth. This presents a real threat to mankind, and it is in this
sphere that collisions of national and regional interests are
inevitable. Naturally, the strong will solve their problems at the
expense of the weak. Even now environmentally unsafe indus-
tries are shifted towards less-developed countries. They are
becoming a world garbage dump for hazardous industrial
waste.
No doubt, the problems of natural resources and the envi-
ronment will continue to be tackled by the joint efforts of the
international community. But, alas, in reality they will be solved

























result one can expect the growth of tension between the rich giants
and the rest of the world, a phenomena which quite recently was
called the fight against neocolonialism. What is labeled now as
Islamic fundamentalism is just an offshoot of these phenomena.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to expect that the twenty first
century will witness a decrease in ethnic conflicts. Rather they will
become more brutal not only due to their intrinsic character, but
as a result of global rivalry for the resources and the environment.
Ethnic minorities will be manipulated by outsiders.
It would be a thankless job to enumerate all of the factors
which may affect future developments. My task is very modest: just
to show that the world of ours will hardly become a quiet and
comfortable place to live in. (Possibly no proof is needed at all.)
The state of affairs will be determined not so much by the harmo-
ny of national interests as by their clashes.
This fact leads to at least two pessimistic conclusions:
- sovereign states will need national armed forces;
- sovereign states will need special intelligence services.
The Perspective of Intelligence
Being the tool of the policy of their states, the intelligence
services, naturally, influence the decision-making process but do
not determine its outcome. The situation can hardly change in the
future. Objectives and priorities of the services will be subordinat-
ed to the interests of national policy.
Only effective intelligence can provide timely warnings of
threats to national security, detect opportunities for the promotion
of national interests, and use them in a specific intelligence man-
ner.
This is, roughly, the essence of any intelligence doctrine at the
end of the twentieth century. One can safely bet that the essence,
if not the wording, will remain the same in the next century.
Acquisition and analysis of information which can be reached only
by specific means and support of national foreign policy will, in
my opinion, remain universal values for the services of all coun-
tries. And, of course, within this very broad framework every serv-
ice will act in its own particular manner in accordance with nation-
al laws and traditions.
In recent years the problem of cooperation or the interaction
of different services became the subject of lively, open and confi-
dential discussions. In general, such cooperation is rightly consid-
ered to be important in counteracting common threats, namely,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materi-
als, terrorism, narcotraffic. Quite often, the idea of this coopera-
tion is presented as something entirely novel, something that



























may get the impression that this very cooperation will be the main-
stream of intelligence activities in the future.
This view runs counter to the facts of life. The cooperation of
intelligence services is possible only in those fields where the inter-
ests of their respective states coincide, which happens rarely
enough and practically never in full measure. Even the mentioned
sinister triad - nuclear weapons, terrorism and drugs - is far from
being the matter of primary concern for every country. Thus, one
may speak only about cooperation between some services in
some matters. Even with the best and closest relations between the
services, their cooperation extends, as a rule, to the exchange of
information, joint analysis and estimate of certain situations,
sometimes to operational support, i.e. it is limited to areas
removed from the heart of every service - its sources. The inherent
secrecy of the intelligence work puts natural limits to the closest
cooperation. Those who disregard this principle may pay dearly
for it.
Certain apprehensions exist that the real sovereignty of small-
er and weaker countries will continue to be impinged upon. In this
case it could not be ruled out that their intelligence potential will
be exploited by stronger partners under the guise of cooperation.
So, it is difficult to foresee any dramatic changes in the func-
tion of intelligence or a substantial move for the better in our con-
flict-ridden world. Possibly, some miracle will take place though
the historical experience of, at least, two millennia teaches that to
count on positive miracles would be somewhat risky.
There are grounds to presume that the most significant
changes may take place on the technical side of intelligence. The
progress of science, regretfully, cannot be stopped, and practical-
ly each scientific achievement is turned to intelligence and military
uses. The progress may not be limited to the quantitative side
alone: better satellite spies, better super-computers for breaking
ciphers, higher sensitivity of listening, watching, recording devices,
new means of surveillance, etc. The cost of technical gadgets will
inevitably increase, the processing of the information obtained by
technical means will demand an increasing number of analysts,
and correspondingly, the cost of the product will go up. The lim-
its here will be set, as ever, by the financial considerations and the
common sense of state leaders. Naturally, the development of the
technological capabilities of intelligence will call for correspon-
ding defensive means of counterintelligence, which never lags far
behind.
But a qualitative breakthrough in intelligence work may take
place exactly in the technological field. It concerns the possibility
of remote control of the human mind. The practical experience of
a number of years makes me very skeptical as far as sensations

























guided enthusiasts who tried to muddle our collective brain with
bizarre inventions. Nevertheless, the pessimistic view of scientific
progress makes me believe that we may face something entirely
novel in the field of remote mind control. The party, which
achieves this, will gain a great, though transitory, superiority over
its opponents, partners, and allies. There can be no doubt that
intelligence in the future will resort to the increasing use of mod-
ern technologies. Nevertheless, its main and most effective tool
will remain the man, “asset”, “source”, and “agentura”. It is the
man, “humint,” who allows to separate truth from lie, to detect
decoys and misinformation, to give true bearings to analysts.
(“Humint” is relatively cheaper than technical and analytical
effort, though in individual cases it may look quite expensive.)
This assertion is borne out, in particular, by contemporary
Russian experience. Our society became entirely open to the
world and still the intelligence services of our international part-
ners are conducting “humint” activities on an unprecedented
scale all over the former Soviet Union. “Humint” does not solve
only the problems of today, it lays the foundation for future work,
allows the service to be prepared for changes of the circum-
stances.
One can safely presume that the significance of “humint” will
not be reduced by the march of technical progress. Moreover, it
may increase, especially in the field of “covert operations” or, in
old KGB parlance, “active measures,” in other words, influencing
the solution of this or that problem by specific intelligence means.
Intelligence services have been actively, though silently, participat-
ing in all major and minor international conflicts. They did not
always succeed, which meant bloodshed and material expense.
Their potential was not fully utilized. Evidently, the role of intelli-
gence in future collisions will increase and that will mean a
greater demand for “humint.”
And, finally, a question arises whether there can be significant
changes in the unwritten rules of the game. The present rules are
defined by the goals set before services by political leadership and
by the price which the leadership is prepared to pay for a failure,
the price in terms of prestige, money, lives, etc. The principle will
hardly change so long as intelligence lives and works, though
occasional attempts to evolve some internationally accepted
framework for its activities cannot be ruled out.
The more the world changes the more it remains the same.
Come to think of it, it is an optimistic view of history.
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